I
The first definition is also a distinction that will and has proved useful, not only in the context of death and dying. but to medical practice in genera l.
Thi5 is the di::.tinction between ORDINARY and EXTRAORDINARY means. This distinction has a long history both in medicine and ethics: it is over 400 years o ld. 5 And while there is almost complete agreement in the application of these terms in medicine and in morals, there can be some nuanced differences because the presuppositions of its moral use can be wider than those of its medica l use. ln medicine. some narrow the acceptance of these terms in relation ro science only. Thus. "ordinary means'' connote means which are regarded as "customary", ''standard", '·orthodox", and "tested". procedures in relation to medica/science as it now is. "Extraordinary means" would connote the "unusual", "heroic". "orthodox". "unproved" or "experimental" Februar), 1987 procedures which are incompletely established or simply unestablished. again in relation LO medical science as it now is. Thus, many of today's "ord inary means" were yesterday's ·'extraordinary means" not because morals are changing. but because science is progressing.
Morally, OR DINAR Yand EXTRAORDINARY means are calculated ethically-not in relation only to science as s uch -bu t in relation ro the patient's actual conditions and factual circumstances, some of which would not be strictly medical or scientific. Thus, in concise form. the cluster of relevant criteria can be stated: all medicines, procedures, treatments and operations which: (I) offer a reasonable hope of benefit to this patient. (2) witho ut serious danger of death. and (3) without excessive burden. pain. hardship, even subjective repugnance.
Defining 'Ordinary' and 'Extraordinary'
If a particular procedure, treatment or operation does offe r an individual patient a reasonable hope of benefit without serious danger or excessive burdens. then that treatment is fo r that patient an ORDLNA R Y means in his / her circumstances.
If. on the other hand, a particular treatment offers a particular patient no reasonable hope of benefit, or does involve serious danger of death, or only a precarious and burdensome prol ongation of life. then that is an EXTRAO R DINARY means for that patient in his j her circumstances.
Traditional ly. all are considered bound to use "ordinary means" to preserve their li fe, health and bodily integrity. (Failure to do so would et hically be suicidal.) Usually. one is not bound to use "extraordinary means" for same . but is free to do so if one so chooses. In short. ''ordinary means" are considered obligatory; "extraordina ry" are optional.
Th is, of course. is a statemen t of general principle(s) which requ ires refinement and concrete exemplification to clarify its extension and comprehension. While the terms are widely received in porxular discourse, the ir timeless rep etition is not a lways accompanied by timely understanding.
While the ordinary ext raordi nary distinction is very o ld. much o f its present precision is attributed to the formal and extens ive teaching of the late Pope Pius X I I, in particular his address. covering this subject. of No\ '. 24. 1957 While some of the above statements have the advantage of being concise, and, therefore, apparently clear, their rationale and ref\nement deserve some close attention if they are to serve as more tha~ mere rhetorical points of reference.
1-a) Rationale. The rationale and basis for the ordinary / extraordinary distinction in Catholic teaching is meant to reflect the difference between a negative prohibition which is tightly circumscribed, and. a posi1ive admonition which can't be circumscribed in general. but only in concrete particulars.
The received teaching understands the 5th Commandment. ("Thou shalt not kill! Ex. 20:13: Mil. 19: 18) in both positive and negative terms.9
The negative prohibition -in exceptionless form -proscribes and means never directly take the life of an innocent or he lpless person. Positively, the same commandment proscribes an obligation to take care of our life, health and bodily integrity. which positive duty is to be fulfilled affirmatively within reasonable and proportionate limits. For this reason, "ordinary" means are said to be obligatory. and "extraordinary" means are optional.
1-b) Within the notion of ORD INARY means, it is now necessary to make some mention of MI IMAL means. "Minimal means" are always presumed to be "ordinary" while allowing that their mechanical delivery, in unusual circumstances might, by exception, qualify as "extraordinary" means.
"Minimal" means could be defined as basic hygiene and supportive measures. namely food. water. bed rest. room temperature and personal hygiene. We owe these measures of support to other human beings simply because they are human beings. In pediatric cases, where the patient cannot, by definition, be self-supporting, one can consider normal feeding. blood, oxygen. clearing air passages. supplying warmtp as ''minimal" and mandatory means. Neglect of these would, in fact, be destructive.
1-c) Some have recently and mistakenly converted this ordinary/ extraordinary distinction into a proportionate / disproportionate calculus. T ndeed. no Jess than a Presidential Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research proposes this substitution. 10 Now, while it is certainly the right and privilege of a Presidential Commission to make recommendations about which distinctions are or are not any longer useful in the "formulation of public policy," 11 I find it somewhat droll that the same federal commission would take it upon itself to reformulate Vatican leaching on behalf of the Vatican. 1 2 (l suspect that that Commission's ethical over-reach was due not to lack of interest, but to its own over-reliance on one of its acknowledged consultants -J~ J. Paris, S.J.-whose somewhat confused grasp of received Catholic teaching may well have confused the Commission.) 13 1-d) Rather than re-interpret what the 1980 ·'Declaration On Euthanasia" allegedly "substitutes··. it would be better to see what it actually does say and propose as clarification (rather than ~ubstitution) in the ordinary ex traordinary distinction:
It wi II be pos!.ible 10 ma ~e a correct J udgmem a-. to the mea m. by .. tud~ i ng 1 he llfll' of 1 reatment u\ed. it~ degree of comt>le \111 o r ri.,k. i 1' co 11 and l he I"" 1ihili1 it'' of using it. and Ullllf>aring thc~e clement~ with the rc,ult that can be expected. -Likewise it is permissible to interrupt these same means where resu lt~ fall short of expectations in accord with the rea~onable wishc~ of the patient, the patient's family and the ad\'ice of physicians e~pecially competent in the matter.
It is a lso permissible to make do with the normal means medici ne can offer for "one ca nnot impose on anyone the obligation to have recourse to an available technique which involves a rea l danger or is burdensome." Such a refusal is not the equivalent of suicide but should be considered an acceptance of the human condition.
Lastly, when death is imminent. one can refu~e forms of treatment which \\ould secure only a precarious and burdensome prolongatio n of life. so long as the normal ca re due to the s ict.. person. in s i m il arca~es. is not interrupted_ I:\
In all of the above. the designation ordinary extraordinary i~ predica ted of the meam. NOT of the /((e of the patient. Clearly. if a patient's life can be described as "extraordinary". then any and all mean:-._:e,cn the most minima l means -cou ld be described as extraordinary to that patient. which effectively finesses the question and the carefu l judgment of the factual circumstances of the indi' idual case.
Easy to Slid e in to Judgment!)
It is all too ea~y today ro ~l i de or to jump into faci le. even popular.
"qua li ty of life" judgments while pretending not to pass or make a judgment at all. Again, the proper judgment focuses on the extraordinariness of the means. not on some a llegedly extraordinary It/e.
Of course. such factors as expec tation of success or degree of com fort in surv ival do pertain to and focus on qualities of the patient's life. However. a now widespread and. in some places. a legal term such as "reco\'cry to cognitive and sapient life" is a d ifferen t kind of"quality-of-life"judgment. It sen·es now as a code word and deserves to be unpacked. " Recovery" is an unspecified promise word! Recovery to what degree? To what extent? What of those persons for whom there is no recovery? Some are born with physical or mental disabilities from which there is no recovery.
"Cognitive and sapient life." These terms have been bo uncing around the euthanasia movement for the past 80 years. Both are accordion words-either can mean as much or as little as one chooses to assign to it. One may judge from what I say here that I am not all that "cognitive". which might make me wonder whether this audience is all that "sapient." These are not accurate diagnostic ratings of pathologies but only scientificsounding value judgments some people make about other people.
The same slippery and careless kind of value judgment is buried in another popular slogan-"meaningful life"! Meaningful to whom? To you? To me? To the editorial board of a favorite newspaper? Whoever makes this kind of quality-of-l ife kind of judgment will not be on the receiving end of such a judgment and. whatever degrees of "meaningfulness" are assigned to another person's life, we should not forget that that life is the only life that person has.
1-e) A patient may live a long time with a so-called "hopeless d isease". so. a particular mea ns may be useless in curing a disease. but useful in prolonging or supporting life. The fact that it will not cure the disease does not change the positive duty we have to use means which support or preserve life. If a means will prolong life and is not too burdensome. that is. I think, an ordinary means. One cannot s imply argue that the disease is incurable and. by that fact alone, no obligation exists to preserve or support life. The presumption underlying the opposite conclusion does rest on a porous quality-of-life decision . i.e .. if one's life does not or wi ll not meet a certain standard. it is not considered worth living or preserving or supporting.
1-f) The 1980 "Declaration On Euthanasia'' and prior statements as well. outline princip les wh ich refer to burden and benefit, or use. If a treatment is not burdensome and would be beneficial. it is cons~dered "ordinary". and a duty to use it. In conventional ethics, preserving or supporting life is considered a benefit. Burden here, of course, refers to a burden suffered or carried by the patient, not whether this ordinary support is a burden on the community. or a burden on third-party payers. or a burden to visit such a patient o n alternate Wednesdays.
1-g)
Traditionally, the o rdinary I extraordinary distinction is not limited to terminal cases. It can bear on cases of radical amputation or hemodialysis which can prolong life indefinitely. In these cases. the decisive focus may not be whether iil benefits the patient -for clearly it does but w hether or how excessive a burden an indi vidua l patient can carry.
Father John Connery. S .J .. is, I think. correct in preferring to keep separate the benefit/ burden ana lysis in that they can be different issues often applying to different cases. The question of benefit looms larger in February. 19g7 termina l cases. burden looms larger in non-terminal cases. and wh ile there can be reason~ to separate them it i:, not object ionable to combine them. I~ Also. there can as we ll be significant differences in terminal and nonterminal ca~es. Often when death is imminent (in moral terms "imminent" is measured in hours and days. not in captions of six months or one year to live), in a terminal case. nothing reasonable can be done whatever we choose. whereas. at life's beginnings. ma ny reasonable things can be done but some choose not to do them.
In summary here. there is no pre-coded checklist or printout which can determine antecedently \.vhat i~ or is not an ordinary or extraordinary mean!> as such. apart from the minimal and most highly experimental mean::.. The correct determination of the extraordinarinesl> of extraordinary means can only be made on a case by case ba~i s in \'iew of the factual and actual circumstances of that caseY From this section. it will appear tha t I am not particularly sanguine about what the general statutes of ci' il law can establish or resolve. given the nature of the ordinary extraordinary distinction. From what follows. it should also appear that I do not believe most recent and current legislati\'e proposals are after that but are. perhaps. after so meth ing else.
II

A Clear and Present Danger
Apart from the public policy question of whether or not the ordinary ' extraordinary distinction is helpful or even useful. new terminology has begun to permeate public discussion. legislative proposa ls: legal decisions and the death -and -dying literature. The last is definitely a growth industry.
IL is common. now. to speak in te r ms of ACT IVE (positive) and PASSIVE (negative) euthanasia as ideas whose time has come. I submit that the time ha!> come to examine these t erm~ closely. I have a little personal rule (which is "' hy I call it "Smith\ Rule") that "All Social Engineering Is Preceded by Verbal Engineering!"
When a di~tinction such as the ordinary extraordinary i~ well grounded in Western medicine. all Western religions and~. at least. compatible with our Anglo-American civil law tradition. I become at least curious about proposed changes of words. lest .;;omcthing else is really changing while appearing to be only a change in words. "All Social Engineering Is Preceded By Verbal Engineering."
And so. the proposal active and passive euthanasia. The term "active" connotes "commission". doing something. e.g .. delivering the deadly dose. a positi'e act'' hich active!) causes death. Most. but surely not all. in our society are at present opposed to this. We might note. hO\o\·ever. that the Er:ir society in England and the He111lvck society in the U.S.A. are not opposed to active euthanasia. Indeed. their publications 1 X advocate euthanasia as a "right" and Derek Humphry's book. Ler Me Die Before I Woke serves as a how-to manual by list ing at the conslusion or several chapters how much of which drugs of what toxicity are needed to cause death in the most efficient fashion.l 9 (Given the national rise in teenage suicide. this particular book does not deserve wide circulation.) This literature is euphemistically described as "self-deliverance" literature without benefit of mentioning just to what or to whom one's self will be delivered.
However. the present danger and greatest current confusion concerns so-called PASSIVE (negative) euthanasia which appears in most legislative proposals and, increasingly. in some court decisions.
At first. "passive" euthanasia seems to reflect the conventional ordinary f extraordinary distinction just mentioned, but it does not do so properly or completely.
The term "passive" connotes ·'omission" (a withholding. a withdrawal) of some treatment or procedure. But the term "passive-omission" is inherently ambiguous until and unless it is determined ll"har kind of means is being passively o mitted. withheld or withdrawn.
On the one hand. the passive omission of an extraordinary means i~ NOT euthanasia and should not be so caUed.2o But, on the other hand. the passi1•e omission of an ordinary means is euthanasia and should be so called.2r
A clarifying definition pertinent to this is found in the 1980"Declaration On Euthanasia" which reads:
By euthanasia b understood an action or an umi,;,ion "hich of itself or by intenuon causes death. in order that all suffering may in this way be eliminated. Euthana~ia's terms of reference. therefore. are to be found in the intention of the will and in the methods used.!! Please, this not merely quibbling over words. All sorts of legislative proposals and court decisions have proposed or decided a patient's alleged "right" to refuse or forego ALL medical means without clarifying whether that refusal refuses extraordinary means (with which oo one really argues or absolutely forbids). or refuses all ord inary means -even minimal means-(with which most. except for euthanatizers, realt y do disagree).
For example, the celebrated C laire Conroy case in New Jersey, decided J an. 17. 1985 . declared no less than four times that a patient has the right "to decline to have any medical treatment" (p. 21); again, "to decline medical treatment" (p. 22, quoting Quinlan): "to refuse medical treatment" (p. 30): and finally "the right to decline anr medical treatment, including artificial feeding" (p. 62). Over and over. the alleged "right" to decline or refuse ANY treatment without clarifying or specifying wlrar kind o f treatment i::. being declined or refused.B
Another example is the sad and troubled Bouvia case in California 'vvhich estab lished the "right'' to refuse ANY and ALL treatment on our Pacific coast. Having first won the legal right not to be fed . Ms. Bouvia next secured a court order to determ ine her morphine leve l. 24 ls this medicine? Or. is the physician now the equivalent of a maitre d' who simply presents a medical menu and takes orders regardless of what the patient (customer) orders or refuses?
It is this unqualified canonization of the passive omission of A Y and ALL treatment that presents a clear and present danger to our public policy and to the ethics of the medical profession. There is no way that this trend can be confined to the death-and-dying context where death is imminent; it has already been moved to and applied to the chronically ill -those pat ients who are not getting any better nor gelling any worse. (It is already selectively applied in pediatric cases; e.g .. Indiana's Baby Doe case.)
If minimal means-food. water, bed rest. room temperature, personal hygiene-can be passively omitted from this class of persons, that is no mere neutral omission, but a lethal omission which causes death; it kills. When a competent patient's ability to request same is compromised and this decision is delegated to a surrogate, to substituted judgment, or to committees of or for that person. the number of players may become larger. but the outcome is no more secure ethically. Already, on March 15, 1986 , meeting in ew Orleans, a seven person committee of the Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs of the American Medical Association. reported out favorably this recommendation:
. . . it is not unethical to disco ntinue all means of life-prolonging. medical treatment . . . for a pa tient in irre\'ersible coma when death i~ imminent: and e\en if death i• not immi nent .. _15 It seems to me. that the small addition of the last clause. "even if death is not imminent'', represents a small step back for man but a giant step backwards for mankind. I do not use the term "mankind" in a sexist se nse, but rather I use it to emphasize that such a step is not ''kind" to man nor woman, for it means we do not treat some as our kind anymore.
Allowing to die. by foregoing extraordinary means. is choosing to live even when d ying. But the omission of ordinary-especially minimalmeans is no mere omission, but a lethal omission. The 198<f "Declaration on Euthanasia" addresses this very point. that it is permitted: . . . to refuse forms of treatment that \\Ould onl~ secure a precariou~ a nd burden~omc prolongation of life . .m long a.1 the n ormal em·<' due to the ~ick per~on in ~i milar case' i~ not i1111'1TIIflll'cf.!• (Empha,is added) Pope J ohn Paull! has tirelessly repeated this last qualification -on Oct. 21. 1985 , addressing two work ing groups of the Pontifical Academy of Sciences Y and again. o n Nov. 15. 1985 , to a Conference on "Pre-Leukaemia" with an important reason stated:
:14 I he prrnc1plc . . . v. hilc it discourage' from e mpl oyment of purely cxperimemal or complete!~ ineffectual operation,. doc' not di,pen~c from the \'ctlid therapeutic ta\h. of \U\taimng life nor from the admimstra tion of the nomwl met1111 of 1'1101 11/f>flllrl . Science. e\·en 11 hen it i' unable to heal. can and 'hould care lor and a"i" the ,jck."' Linacre Quarter]~ Thus, we might offer as a principle: Even when there is no cure, there remains the obligation of human care-that care and assistance which include normal means of vital support.
To expand the "when-death-is-not-imminent'' net can, in our society, be a very extensive net indeed, not only to the irreversib ly comatose, but also to what one journal calls those "biologically tenacious individuals": then to the chronically sick whose "cognitive" functions are lowered. lessened or hardly recordable. Some persons experience such things post trauma; others are born that way. If the most ordinary, even minimal, means of medical maintenance or support are passively omitted, passively withdrawn. or passively withheld from these persons, we have, I submit, not just a new development of words, but a new and transformed medical ethic.
III Problem: Suggested Source and Suggested Cure
A legal litany of court cases is, by now, familiar: Quinlan (NJ ); Saikewicz (MA); Perlmutter (FL); Fox/ Storar (NY); Severns (DE); Brophy ( MA); Herbert (CA); Barber (CA); Bouvia (CA). Traffic is very heavy in Californ ia. as are some heavy precedents.
Curiously, in this age of deregulation. California is the state with the most laws and regulations about death and dying. California was the first to pass a so-called "Natural Death Act" (1976): next, it added a "Durable Power of Attorney" law, and now is considering a third Jaw on "Advanced Directives." Yet this state with the most laws, whose presenting reasons were to "clarify", is the state with the most court cases then and now. Perhaps this only proves that no law is litigation-proof and no Jaw is interpretation-proof.
As suggested above, 1 do not think that positive statutes can resolve antecedently complicated judgments re ordinary/ extraordinary, but poorly drafted statutes will cer tainly complicate matifrs further. There is an axiom in both logic and in law that a negative prohibition binds semper et pro semper. i.e. , it is always in effect and covers all cases. whereas a positive law binds semper sed non pro semper. i.e., it too is a lways in effect but can't touch all cases. Thus, for example, a negative law forbidding auto theft is simple enough; negatively, it forbids the taking (against the reasonable will of the owner) of any and every car, old or new, stretch size or sub-compacts. However a positive law-to pay just taxes-is always in place, but to spell that out positively in all possible circumstances is no small effort. Witness the recent overhaul of our federal tax code (what it applies to. what not). No informed person could possibly suggest that they would or could sum up that positive tax law in a sentence or two, a talk or two, an audit or two. Accuracy there depends on a mountain of factual, actual circumstances, along with a deep valley of possible exceptions.
So too, in the medical-moral decisions re ordinary/ extraordinary February, 1987 means. We already have a law that says physicians cannot kill those they cannot cu re part of the homicide statutes. But. on the other hand, there i~ no law that says a patient or physician must usc AI I means on ALL patients ar ALL times regardless of hard:.hip. burden or grave inconvenience. Such a law would not only be fu tile but ~tupid: one might just as well pass a law against mortality. The fac t is, people do die and we wilL too-whether or not we have accumulated the requisite amount of certified credits in a death and dying course.
The legislative dificu lry is not. as I see it. in the extreme: do EVE R YT H l NG or do NOT H lNG. The difficulty is the \ast in-between. How can a positive statute possibly foresee antecedently all the ac tua l medical factors and relevant health circumstances and possible complications of just the people in this audience? And it is the actual assessment of factual and personal circumstances wh ich is crucia l to the determination of the extraordinariness of cxtraordin<H) meam. in any given factual ca~e.
My legal friend~ tell me that '"hard case~ make bad law". and I suspect that "real ly hard cases make really bad law". It ism) personal opinion that you can't legislate hard cases out of existence. My respect fo r ou r just civil laws is profound and sincere. Indeed. as a form of regulating human conduct in a way con~i stent with human dignity. just civil laws are light years ahead of whatever is in second p l <~ce.
Questio n of Trust
But one problem which is not discussed very much in the rush to litigate a nd lcgi~l atc is the question of trust. 1 ~uspcct that you can'tlcgi~l<lle trust. either. just a~ 1 su~pect and know that the core element in the physicianpatient relationship is the b<~-.is in trust and the virtue of trust. Medicine. like any learned profession. rests on and needs a relationship of trust, which is why th<1t profession. and others. require a professional oath and code of ethics.
My suggestion here is that this is the root rrob lcm: our soc iety and publ ic policy arc making and c hanging the rrofess ional oath and e th ics of the med ica l profession. The past decade ( 1976-1986) of legis lative act ivity. so-called Living Wi lls, a tura l De<1th Acts. Durable Powers of Attorney. Advance Directi\es. etc .. have all advanced under the banner of unqualified patient autonomy to the extent that the 7enith of unqualified autonomy has been reached and one of the co re components of tradi tional medical ethics has been reversed.~'~ If the most recent Bouvia decision becomes the societal trend then the new medical ethic turns on W HO is to CHOOSE rather than WHAT is C H OS Er\. Procedural mechanisms are so designed to ensure "free choice'· that they offer no coherent guidance for judging the relative goodness of that choice.
Unqu<~l ifi ed a utonomy mechanism~ do not assist p h ysici<~ns to d i~charge their deepest eth ical responsibi lity first do no harm (primum non nocerel), nor their duty to formulate individualized treatment recommendations based on a medically informed understanding of the patient's good .30 In the new ethic, patient choice (autonomy) is more important than best interest (beneficence). This is the complete triumph of procedural ethics (mechanisms and modalities of consent) over substantive ethics (the oath a nd promise first to do no harm). The new ly commi tted physician is reduced to a committed facilitat01·. committed to carrying o ut patient preferences regardless of the outcome of that preferential c hoice. Unless corrected . not simply by steppi ng off the case. this is a danger not only to physicians but to the medical community as an o rganized profession. committed by oath to a known ethic.
Consider the question of suicide. No jut-isdict ion in these United States penali7es suicide as a crime. If o ne succeeds, the case is moot: if o ne fails in the attempt, we consider that a cry fo r help needing counseling, not incarcera ti on. Yet, in most jurisdictions. it is a crime to assist a suicide.
Consider next the concluding sections of most of the so-called Living-Will legislation. Almost a ll con clude with ca utions and disclaimers: that this new law has no civi l nor criminal liab ility consequences re suicide: no insurance co nsequences re suicide: no professional peer rebuke consequences re suicide. In net result. such laws and similar court decisions. especially those proclaiming a " right" to refuse ANY and ALL means. including the most minimal means, simply de-criminalize and de-fang all the possible penalties or consequences of assisting a suicid e.
Thus, in effect. we simply de-criminalize and detoxify the anti-assisted suicide statutes without even debating t he merits or demerits of the c rime of assisting a suicide.
A certa in recogninble sequence emerges:
(I) it is not unethical to remove all ~uppo rt:
(2) a helpful court or legislature dccl<tre~ this a new "right": (3) it becomes unco nstit utio na l to interfere with the e.'\t n:isc of this ne\1 "right"': (4) a move on the fede ra ltreas ur) o r Medicare to insure t hat poor people ha\e the sa me access to t hi s nc'' "right" as the rich do: (5) then we ha ve no more laws agai nst as>isti ng a suicide and physicians who dec li ne to faci litate such choices will be branded "sectarian". "diYisin•" and. no doubt. guilty of trying to "' impose theinalue~" on poor sid people who arc only trying to exercise their new "rights". ' There are precedents for this sequence in our society.
If the suggestion is correct as to the problem-a c ha nged and new medical ethic-then the suggested resolution and cure will be found not in legislation, but in a resolution of ethics.
The medical profession. like all professions in our society. has suffered the same reductionist pressure. i.e., reducing the oath a nd ethic of the profession simply to t he promise not to do anyth ing illega l! Obviously, that promise has a built-in drain. One promises to change or adjust one's ethics with every change or adjustment in law. Compound t hat with the triumph of procedural ethics over substantive ethics. and the physicianpatient rela tionship is turned pretty much inside-out.
Crucial Adherence to Oath
It is particu larly the area of euthanasia where adherence to the professional oath is crucial. A scalpel can either cure or kill: as can drugs. These substa nces are blind as to their purpose and results. but the hand that guides cannot be blind. Hisrorically. one motivational source for physician's practice came from the profession's solidarity regarding the high value of human life, of health and of compassionate therapeutic intervention. In the eu thanasia field, we need not invent the future: we need only remember the past ! In this century, we have learned in horrifying detail what does happen when the eth ics of medicine cha nges or collapses or fa ils to speak up; when the power to cure gets mixed up with the power to kill. ·· Lehenstllmerren Leben"! (" Life not worth living!"') That there is such a thing as a "life devoid of value"! Binding and Hoc he wrote of "absolutely worthless human beings: those who have 'neither the will to live nor to die'; those who are 'mentally completely dead' " . .14Notice. with a publication date of 1920. the concept of a "life not worth living" was not a azi invention, but with the collapse or withdrawal of the medicaL legal and ministerial professions, the Nazis had no qualms about picking up a well-prepared and field-tested idea that fitted so well their own maniacal purposes.
For many of our contemporaries, their only view of pre-Hitler Germany, the Weimar Republic, is a splendid performance by Joel Gray in the broadway show, Cabaret. The moral decadence and ethical drift were true and were not limited to nightclub performers. A "Silent Secularization" preceded National Socialism in the Weimar Germany of the 1920s and 1930s. lt was a secu lar insistence that man-made ethics is superior and should take precedence over transcendent values and over the moral ideals of our common Judea-Christian heritage.J 5 The "smart money" in the medical field felt a real need to break out of the old and tired doctrines of the Hippocratic Oath.
The secular dri ve to first separate, then privatize all transcendent values and ethics in Weimar greatly facilitated the professional acceptance and acquiescence of that pivotal pitfall that there is such a thing as a "life-notworth-living". Dr. Alexander traces the whole euthanasia movement back to this single change in mind and attitude; once we change our attitude toward the non-rehabilitable sick, we are prepared to change everything. The antidote is simply stated and it is eth ical: when there is no cure, we still provide human care! This does not require ethically optional extraordinary care, but it does require ordinary care and certainly those minimal means which are required to sustain, support and preserve any human life.
I consider it a privilege to be a trustee of Calvary Hospital in the Bronx, an institution committed to patients with advanced cancer. While there is no cure for advanced cancer, we do provide medical and human care at that hospital. Here. at this Cardinal Cooke Health Care Center. for many. there is no cure, but medical and human care are provided. Jt's a simple rule, but a crucial one . and it is rooted more in ethics than anything else: where there is no cure, we do provide human care.
I do not here pretend to articulate public policy. I do not pretend to answer any and all legal questions. I do not pretend that there are not or will not be some very hard cases. but I make no pretense or apology for what is needed to approach any of those subjects.
The core problem is a matter of trust and that is a matter of ethics. committed trust to a promised oath and ethic: first, do no harm-no active harm, no passive harm. That is the core commitment of the medical profession and must be the first commitment in the actual practice of medicine.
No profession is immune to ignorance, human weakness, temptation or greed. and that most definitely includes my own. And that is why the function of a professional code and ethic is to give the professional his/ her mark, the target for which he/ she must aim. To miss chronically or to permit the miss to become a habit, is to institutionalize self-service and change a dedicated goal into a so phisticated cover-up-yes, even a sophisticated legal cover-up.
1 know, as you do. that somf' consider jt clever to be cynical, and some consider it enlightened to be unbelieving, and some consider it sensible to be prudently silent. But, the cynical, unbelieving, sensible types have been all too willing to put professional success ahead of true standards and to put cleverness aheaj of real chara.cter. That will not serve real patients. lt will not serve the i 1dividual patient however compromised, nor serve the medical professio11 however litigated, nor will it serve our society however much some don't want to look at i10r valu e those of us who don't function too well or hardly at all.
As Prof. Paul Ramsey often points out. the good that we can do will only be complemented and completed by the harm we refuse to do. Let the first principle of medical ethics be the last word: First. do no harm! Next, do no harm! Last, do no harm to any person of allegedly great value or allegedly no value. First and last. DO NO HARM!
